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It is commonly supposed in public and academic discourse that inflation and big government are
related. The authors show that economic theory delivers such a prediction only in special cases.
As an empirical matter, inflation is significantly positively related to the size of government mainly
when periods of war and peace are compared. The authors find a weak positive peacetime time-
series correlation between inflation and the size of government and a negative cross-country corre-
lation of inflation with non-defense spending. (JEL E52, E61, E63)
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theories of inflation and public finance both in
static models and in the steady states of dynamic
models. These normative theories—following
Barro (1979), Judd (1989), and others—might also
be used as positive theories of long-run inflation.
The lessons we learn from these studies are that,
on the one hand, the conventional optimal tax
considerations have suggested that the optimal
inflation tax should increase with government
spending (e.g., Mankiw, 1987, Veigh, 1989, and
Poterba and Rotemberg, 1990); on the other hand,
it has also been shown that, when money is a cer-
tain type of “intermediate good,” it is not neces-
sarily optimal for bigger governments to inflate
more (e.g., Kimbrough, 1986, Woodford, 1990, and
Correia and Teles, 1996).
We also review the dynamic stochastic theo-
ries of public finance in which governments opti-
mally inflate and deflate in response to surprises
caused by government spending shocks and eco-
nomic conditions. These models emphasize the
unanticipated portion of government spending
and seem particularly applicable to times of war
T
raditionally, economic reasoning has
been used to explain the reactions of
consumers and firms to government
policies. There is now growing appre-
ciation that economic reasoning can explain
government behavior as well. Can such reason-
ing explain which countries inflate and when?
Alesina and Summers (1993), Cukierman (1992),
and many others have recently begun to try to
make such predictions.
Although we have relatively little to add to
the literature on positive theories of inflation, we
believe that one correlation in particular is espe-
cially relevant for such theories: the correlation
between inflation and the size of government.
With much being said in the literature on the
theory of inflation, it is important to see how the
theoretical predictions match the empirical evi-
dence. Such evidence is provided in this paper.
We study, from a public-finance perspective, how
inflation varies across countries and over time in
response to the changes in the size of government.
In particular, we first discuss how the quantity
of government spending fits into the normative
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Our empirical analysis makes three contribu-
tions to the literature. First, we use three dimen-
sions of data—cross-country, time-series, and
wartime—to study how inflation responds to
government spending, whereas previous studies
mainly looked at cross-country evidence (e.g.,
Campillo and Miron, 1997, and Click, 1998). The
cross-country analysis is most suitable to study
the long-run relation between inflation and the
size of government—or, in other words, how infla-
tion responds to permanent changes in the size
of government. To study how inflation responds
to temporary changes in the size of government,
time-series analysis is more appropriate. The war-
time analysis provides evidence of what happens
to inflation when the temporary changes in gov-
ernment spending are large. In particular, we
study the behavior of inflation during suspensions
of convertibility in the classical gold-standard
periods and in the paper-standard periods.
Second, we study how inflation responds to
the changes in not only total government spending
but also its components, defense and non-defense
spending. Distinguishing between defense and
non-defense spending is necessary because most
of the large temporary changes in the size of gov-
ernment are due to changes in defense spending
in wartime, whereas other increases in the size
of government are mainly due to the secular
increases in non-defense spending. Also, changes
in defense spending are more likely to be exoge-
nous than changes in non-defense spending
(Becker and Mulligan, 2003). Hence the effects of
defense spending on inflation may be different
from those of non-defense spending. The previous
studies on this topic, such as Campillo and Miron
(1997) and Click (1998), did not study how infla-
tion is related to the components of government
spending.
Third, we use an instrumental variable (IV)
method to mitigate the potential bias caused by
the endogeneity of government size and non-
defense spending in the ordinary least-squares
(OLS) regressions.1 The IV we use is the ratio of
Social Security spending to output, because,
although the ratio of Social Security spending to
output is correlated with the ratio of non-Social
Security non-defense government spending to
output, it is unlikely to be correlated with infla-
tion directly. This independence arises because
most countries rely exclusively on payroll taxes
to finance Social Security spending.2 We will
discuss more about the appropriateness of the
instrument in the third section. Previous studies
did not attempt to correct the possible endogene-
ity problems in their OLS regressions.
The next section reviews the existing theories
of inflation. The third section presents evidence
from 80 countries showing that there is little
cross-country correlation between inflation and
the size of government. Defense spending is
slightly positively correlated and non-defense
spending slightly negatively correlated with infla-
tion. Thus, although we explicitly recognize that
seigniorage enters the government budget con-
straint, we suggest that the emphasis of Sargent
(1982) and others on “inflation as a fiscal phenom-
enon” is not very useful for predicting inflation
across countries. These results are also contrary
to previous studies, such as those by Grilli,
Masciandaro, and Tabellini (1991) and Campillo
and Miron (1997), that found a positive correla-
tion between inflation and the size of government.
The fourth section studies U.S. and U.K. time-
series data on inflation and government spending.
We show that inflation and the size of government
have both trended upward while the temporary
increases in government spending during wartime
have also been positively correlated with inflation.
The fifth section takes a closer look at wartime
inflation during suspensions of convertibility in
the classical gold-standard and the paper-standard
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1 There are several possibilities of why government spending may
be endogenous. For example, governments may want to reduce
spending or their deficit to reduce inflation. Cukierman (1992) and
Becker and Mulligan (1997) also suggest that government spending
may respond to inflation and not the other way around (which is
discussed in the next session). Finally, governments with limited
means for taxing their citizens cannot spend very much and must
rely relatively heavily on seigniorage for the little revenue that they
do spend.
2 In some countries, such as the United States, Social Security pay-
ments are indexed to the changes in the cost of living. However,
the ratio of Social Security spending to output may not necessarily
change with the cost of living because of the high correlation
between the changes in the cost of living and the changes in the
gross domestic product (GDP) price deflator.periods. We show that inflation rises above nor-
mal at the beginning of wars, whereas inflation
falls below normal at the conclusion of wars
except in countries that are defeated.
THEORY
In this section, we review the normative the-
ories of inflation in public finance that relate infla-
tion to the size of government. The review also
provides a guide to our empirical specifications.
Inflation in the Static Theory of Public
Finance
It has been argued by Barro (1979), Judd
(1989), and others that the normative theory of
public finance can also serve as a positive theory
of government policy. Although a literal applica-
tion of the normative theory absurdly suggests that
economies are run by “benevolent social plan-
ners,” Becker (1983 and 1985), Wittman (1995),
and others have shown that in more realistic polit-
ical models of government decisionmaking, poli-
cies reflect efficiency considerations in the long
run. For example, Becker’s (1983, p. 386) propo-
sition 4 states that “competition among pressure
groups favors efficient methods of taxation.” Thus
we first turn to the normative theory of public
finance to obtain a prediction for the relationship
between inflation and the size of government.
Following Ramsey (1927), Phelps (1973)
argues that, because seigniorage is a source of
government revenue, the marginal deadweight
loss of inflation should be equated to the marginal
deadweight loss of other taxes. Presumably the
marginal deadweight loss of other taxes is greater
when the government must raise more revenue.
So, assuming the relevant portion of the seignior-
age Laffer curve is upward sloping, larger govern-
ments should have higher inflation rates, more
seigniorage, and a greater marginal deadweight
loss from inflation.
However, it has been argued by Kimbrough
(1986), Woodford (1990), and others that Ramsey’s
(1927) formulation does not directly apply to the
inflation tax because the inflation tax affects the
marginal deadweight loss of other taxes. With
some configurations of tastes and technologies,
the marginal deadweight loss of inflation and
that of other taxes can never be equated because
a higher inflation rate sufficiently increases the
marginal deadweight loss of other taxes such that
the Ramsey-optimal “inflation tax rate” is zero.3
In many models, an optimal inflation tax rate of
zero—often referred to as the “Friedman rule,”
due to Milton Friedman’s (1969) advocacy of
such a policy—corresponds to a zero nominal
interest rate and an inflation rate equal to zero
minus the real interest rate.
Because inflation and nominal interest rates
in nearly every country and every year since
1945 have been positive, the Friedman rule can
hardly serve as a positive theory of inflation. But
can the basic logic of the models of Kimbrough
(1986), Woodford (1990), and others deliver a
prediction for the relationship between inflation
and the size of government? If the reason for
deviating from the Friedman rule has to do with
reasons of politics or equity, then these models
are not up to the task. But, as Woodford (1990),
Faig (1988), and others have pointed out, the
Ramsey-optimal inflation tax rate is positive for
some of these models. Unfortunately, these mod-
els are still pretty ambiguous about the relation-
ship between inflation and the size of government.
To see this, consider the model of Mulligan and
Sala-i-Martin (1997), which they show to be a
generalized version of many of the models that
have appeared in the literature. In the spirit of
the inventory models of demand for money,
money reduces the transaction costs, or “shopping
time,” of purchasing consumption goods rather
than entering the consumer’s utility function.
Utility is therefore defined only over consumption
and leisure, u￿c,l￿, a function that is assumed to
have the usual properties. Shopping time v is a
function of two variables: the amount of transac-
tions and the real money stock held by the con-
sumer. The quantity of transactions is assumed
to be equal to c plus a fraction ʻ of consumption
tax revenues, ˄c: This allows for the possibility
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3 See also Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1996), Correia and Teles
(1996, 1999), and de Costa and Werning (2007) for situations in
which the Friedman rule is optimal. Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin
(1997) review the literature and discuss the economics of these
results.that not all taxes have to be paid with money or
that the “velocity” of money used to pay taxes is
greater than the velocity of other money. Mulligan
and Sala-i-Martin define the indirect utility func-
tion, V￿˄,R￿, according to
subject to
where R is the nominal interest rate and T is the
time endowment. The Ramsey problem is
where g is government spending (taken as given
in the Ramsey problem) and c￿˄,R￿ and m￿˄,R￿
are “demand functions” from the consumer’s
optimization program.
Within the above framework, Mulligan and
Sala-i-Martin showed that how R and g are related
depends crucially on the functional forms of the
indirect utility function, V, and the transaction
function, v. In particular, their proposition 10
states the following:
If the shopping time function v(x,m) is homoge-
neous of degree one and the Laffer conditions
hold,4 then the Ramsey optimal inflation tax
depends only on the monetary parameters (the
fraction of taxes paid with money, ʻ, and the
shape of the shopping time function v￿.￿).
(Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin, 1997, p. 704)
That is, although the Ramsey-optimal inflation
tax is not necessarily zero, it is independent of the
size of government in the special case described
by the proposition. Thus we cannot say for sure
whether static optimal tax considerations predict
a positive relationship between inflation and the
size of government. However, Mulligan and
Sala-i-Martin’s (1997) calibration of the monetary
parameters from micro and macro empirical
studies of consumer behavior suggest that, when
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inflation tax is quite small and quantitatively
insensitive to the size of government.
The Laffer conditions may not hold in some
countries. If the maximum amount of revenue
that can be raised from the non-inflation taxes
(the top of the “non-inflation tax Laffer curve”)
is less than the required revenue, g, then inflation
tax revenue must increase in response to increases
in g. Assuming that the top of the inflation Laffer
curve has not yet been reached, then more g
means higher inflation. One empirically relevant
example may be countries without effective per-
sonal income tax systems. These may be the best
cases for Sargent’s (1982) and others’ emphasis on
inflation as a fiscal phenomenon.
Inflation as State-Contingent Debt
Manager
Lucas and Stokey (1983), Judd (1989), and
others have argued that an optimal tax policy
involves the use of “state-contingent debt.” Citi-
zens buy contingent claims on the government,
which pay off extraordinarily well when govern-
ment revenues (spending) are above (below)
expectations and poorly when government rev-
enues (spending) are below (above) expectations.
Judd (1989) argues that nominal government lia-
bilities and nominal provisions in the tax code
serve this state-contingent debt function, with
monetary policy adjusting the price level appro-
priately to achieve the right pattern of payoffs
for the state-contingent debt. Thus, inflation is
above normal upon the receipt of “bad news”
about the government’s fiscal situation and below
normal upon receipt of “good news.” One empiri-
cal counterpart to good and bad news is the
beginning and end of wars—inflation should be
high during the war and prices should jump down
at the conclusion of the war.5
Inflation as Evidence of a Commitment
Problem
Alesina and Tabellini (1987), Barro and
Gordon (1983a,b), and others have argued that
4 That is, the relevant portion of the seigniorage Laffer curve is
upward sloping.
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5 The exact timing of wartime inflation depends on expectations
about the duration and cost of the war and how those expectations
change over time. The end of a war is, of course, “bad news” to the
defeated country, especially when large reparations are expected.inflation is evidence of a government that cannot
make credible promises. Such governments, opti-
mally inflate to enjoy the short-run benefits of
price-level surprises. Depending on which types
of agents are best represented in the government
(e.g., creditors or debtors), either surprise inflation
or surprise deflation can provide short-run gains
for the government, but it is commonly assumed
in the literature that surprise inflation is desirable.
In this case, governments inflate more in the
absence of commitment. Barro and Gordon
derived a formula for the inflation rate chosen by
the discretionary government: It is an increasing
function of the “full commitment” inflation rate
and an increasing function of the benefits of sur-
prise inflation.6 In particular, they pointed out
that the benefits of surprise inflation include
temporary increases in output and decreases in
real values of government debts.
If the size of government is uncorrelated
with a government’s ability to make commitments
and with the benefits of surprise inflation, then,
because the discretionary inflation rate is an
increasing function of the “full commitment”
inflation rate, the Barro and Gordon model inherits
the predictions of the static public finance model
for the relationship between inflation and the size
of government. Relatively little is known about a
government’s ability to make commitments or the
benefits of surprise inflation, so we can say little
about the correlation between inflation and the
size of government in the general case. However,
Alesina and Summers (1993) have suggested that
governments make commitments by creating an
independent central bank. Inflation should there-
fore be negatively related to central bank inde-
pendence, and, holding constant independence
and the benefits of surprise inflation, inflation
should vary with the size of government and
other variables as suggested by the static theory
of inflation and public finance.
The Size of Government as a Response
to Efficient Taxes
Cukierman (1992) and Becker and Mulligan
(2003) argue that the size of the government
responds to the efficiency of taxes. A country
without access to efficient taxes (perhaps for
technological reasons or because those harmed
by efficient taxes are politically powerful) will
have a smaller government and rely relatively
heavily on inefficient taxes (such as inflation)
for revenue. Thus, inflation and the size of govern-
ment can be negatively correlated.
If we further accept the auxiliary hypothesis
of Becker and Mulligan (2003) that defense spend-
ing is “exogenous” while non-defense spending
is “endogenous” (i.e., more sensitive to the effi-
ciency of taxes), then we also expect defense
spending to be positively correlated with inflation
and non-defense spending to be negatively corre-
lated with inflation.
Because the theory here suggests that govern-
ment spending, especially non-defense spending,
responds to inflation instead of the other way
around, the OLS regressions of inflation on govern-
ment size may be biased. We will discuss how we
use instrumental variable (IV) methods to correct
the potential bias.
CROSS-COUNTRY EVIDENCE
The cross-country analysis provides evidence
on the long-run or steady-state relation between
inflation and the size of government. Our sample
consists of 80 countries during the period 1973-
90. Inflation is measured by the average growth
rates of the consumer price index (CPI) and M1,
and the size of government is measured by the
average of the ratios of general government spend-
ing to GDP.7 Only countries with at least four
consecutive years of observations in the period
1973-90 are included in our sample. Figure 1 is
Han and Mulligan
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e as given. ˀ is actual inflation (chosen
by the government), ˀ
e is expected inflation, and ˀ* is the “static”
or “full commitment” optimal inflation. Because expectations are
formed with full knowledge of the government’s objective, the
equilibrium inflation rate under a discretionary government is
ˀ
e = ˀ = b/a + ˀ*. Thus, given b/a, ˀ varies directly with ˀ*. Also,
ˀ increases as the benefit of surprise inflation, b, increases.
7 Data on general government expenditure, defense spending, and
GDP are from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Government
Finance Statistics Yearbooks (various years) and supplemented
with the United Nations National Accounts Statistics: Main
Aggregates and Detailed Tables (various issues). Data on CPI and
M1 are from the IMF Statistics Yearbook (various years).a scatter diagram displaying the relationship
between inflation and the size of government.
The vertical axis measures the average growth
rate of CPI, and the horizontal axis measures total
government spending as a fraction of GDP. Note
that, although the growth rate of CPI is measured
as the log difference, we display this log difference
on a log scale in the figures. We do so because
inflation rates for a few countries are an order of
magnitude larger than the inflation rates of most
countries. Figure 2 is a scatter diagram with the
average annual growth rates of CPI replaced by
the average annual growth rates of M1 (again on
a log scale).
Contrary to the conventional view, the figures
show a negative relationship between inflation
and the size of government. This negative corre-
lation is confirmed in our regressions. Table 1
shows the regression results using the growth rate
of CPI as the measure of inflation. (The results
using the growth rate of M1 are similar, but are
not shown.) The first four regressions (columns 1
through 4) use the whole sample, whereas the last
four regressions (columns 5 through 8) exclude
six countries that experienced hyperinflation
during the sample period.8 The OLS regressions
of inflation on government size (columns 1 and 5)
show significant negative coefficients.
As discussed in the previous section, other
variables such as defense spending may affect
the relationship between inflation and the size
of government. In the next set of OLS regressions
(columns 2 and 6), we divide total government
spending into defense and non-defense spending
(all as fractions of GDP). The results indicate that
inflation is positively but statistically insignifi-
cantly correlated with defense spending, but
negatively and statistically significantly correlated
with non-defense spending. These coefficients
suggest that the observed negative relationship
8 There is no consensus on the definition of hyperinflation. The six
countries we exclude are those countries that adopted dramatic
policies, including changing their currencies to fight against infla-
tion during 1973-90: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Nicaragua,
and Uruguay. The static theory of inflation and public finance sug-
gests one reason for separating the “hyperinflation” countries from
the rest—hyperinflation countries may be those that are not on the
upward-sloping portion of their non-inflation tax Laffer curves.
Another reason is that those countries appear to be outliers on
Figures 1 and 2.
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Figure 1
Inflation and Government Size, 1973 to 1990Han and Mulligan
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Figure 2
Growth Rate of M1 and Government Size, 1973 to 1990
Table 1
Cross-Country Inflation Regressions, 1973-90 Averages
Dependent variable = log (average annual CPI growth rate)
Excluding countries that
All countries experienced hyperinflation
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Government spending/GDP –1.49 –1.84 –1.04 –1.90
(0.61) (0.93) (0.41) (0.63)
Non-defense spending/GDP –1.57 –1.82 –1.14 –1.89
(0.63) (0.94) (0.41) (0.62)
Defense spending/GDP 0.99 0.98 1.98 1.96
(3.43) (3.43) (2.27) (2.32)
Regression method OLS OLS IV IV OLS OLS IV IV
Number of countries 80 80 80 80 74 74 74 74
R
2 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.11 0.13 0.14
NOTE: Figures in parentheses are standard errors. The instrumental variable in the IV regressions is the average of the ratio of Social
Security spending to GDP in 1973-90.between inflation and government size shown in
Figures 1 and 2 is driven mostly by the negative
relation between inflation and non-defense spend-
ing. The results also suggest that the conventional
view on the link between inflation and govern-
ment size may be true only when defense spend-
ing represents a very important share of total
government spending, for example, during war-
time. But from cross-country regressions we can-
not tell whether the temporary nature of wartime
is important for the relationship between inflation
and the size of government, as is suggested by the
“inflation as a state-contingent debt manager”
model. This issue is better analyzed with the time-
series data, as presented in the next section.
The coefficients of the OLS regressions may
be biased because, as discussed in the previous
section, government spending, especially non-
defense spending, may respond to inflation and
hence be endogenous. We use the ratio of Social
Security spending to GDP as an IV for government
size and non-defense spending. The ratio of Social
Security spending to GDP is a reasonable IV
because, first, it is correlated with government size
and especially non-defense spending other than
SocialSecurityspending.Inthecross-countrydata,
the correlation between Social Security spending
and non-Social Security non-defense spending
(both as a fraction of GDP) is 0.44. (See also dis-
cussions on the correlation by, e.g., Mulligan and
Sala-i-Martin, 1999 and 2004.) Second, because
most countries rely exclusively on payroll taxes
to finance Social Security spending,9 there is no
need for a government to use the inflation tax to
finance it. We note that in some countries, such
as the United States, Social Security payments
are indexed to the changes in the cost of living.
However, because the changes in the cost of liv-
ing and the changes in the GDP price deflator are
highly correlated, the ratio of Social Security
spending to output may not necessarily change
with the cost of living. In other words, inflation
is unlikely to be correlated directly with the
ratio of Social Security spending to GDP.
The IV estimates using the whole sample
(columns 3 and 4) are similar to the OLS estimates.
The results using the sample that excludes the
hyperinflation countries (columns 7 and 8) are
similar to those using the whole sample, except
that the magnitudes of the effects of defense
spending on inflation are stronger, although still
statistically insignificant.
We now include in our inflation regressions
other factors that are correlated with government:
central bank independence, the budget deficit,
and the output level. First, it is often believed that,
because price stability is a chief goal of central
banks, a more independent central bank leads to
lower inflation rates (see, e.g., Cukierman, 1992).
We use two measures of central bank independ-
ence taken from Cukierman (1992). The first one
is a ranking of central bank legal independence in
the 1980s, and the second is the turnover rate of
central bank governors during the period 1950-89.
Government debt or deficit can also be a
potential determinant of the inflation tax. Because
the inflation tax can be used as a direct way to
generate seigniorage or reduce the real value of
outstanding government debts, governments with
larger nominal government debts would be
inclined to inflate more (e.g., Barro and Gordon,
1983a, and Cukierman, Edwards, and Tabellini,
1992). When determining inflation in the “steady
state” of a dynamic model or the static model,
however, only the initial debt-to-GDP ratio matters.
This is because, given the initial debt level, govern-
ments optimally choose the amount of debts and
inflation over time (Cukierman, Edwards, and
Tabellini, 1992). So what we are really interested
in is a reduced-form relation with the initial debt-
to-GDP ratio as one of the exogenous variables.
Based on this, we add the initial debt-to-GDP ratio
to our regressions.10 The debt used is defined as
total public debts minus that held by monetary
authorities. The data used to calculate the ratios
are from 1973 or the year with nonmissing obser-
vations closest to 1973.
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9 The cross-country correlation between Social Security spending
and payroll taxes is high (about 0.87 in our sample). The high
propensity to finance Social Security out of payroll taxes is itself
evidence that the inflation tax is not a substantial source of revenue.
10 We also conducted experiments with an average deficit-to-GDP
ratio in the sample period, instead of initial debt-to-GDP ratio.
The regression results with this alternative measure (not shown
here) are similar.The third variable we add to our regressions
is real GDP per capita (in logs). It has been sug-
gested that a country’s wealth is a good indicator
of the efficiency of the non-inflation taxes (e.g.,
Cukierman, Edwards, and Tabellini, 1992, and
Click, 1998). Also, much has been written on
whether there is any relationship between infla-
tion and output in the long run. If inflation is
related to output, it may induce spurious effects
on the relation between inflation and government
size because the latter is defined as the ratio of
government spending to GDP. So including real
GDP per capita can also reduce these possible
effects.
The results of the OLS and IV estimations
with the above additional variables are shown in
Tables 2 and 3, respectively. As in Table 1, we
show two sets of regressions: one using the whole
sample (columns 1 through 4 in Table 2 and 1
through 6 in Table 3) and another excluding coun-
tries that experienced hyperinflation during the
period 1973-90 (columns 5 through 8 in Table 2
and 7 through 12 in Table 3).11 Because indices
of central bank independence are available only
for about half of the countries, the sample size is
reduced substantially. Comparing the OLS regres-
sions (columns 1 and 5 in Table 2 and 1 and 7
in Table 3 with columns 2 and 6 in Table 1), it
appears that the smaller sample size changes the
signs of the estimated relation between inflation
and defense spending from positive to negative,
although they are still statistically insignificant.
But the smaller sample size seems to have no
qualitative effects on the estimated relation
between inflation and non-defense spending.
For non-defense spending, the coefficients are
Han and Mulligan
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Table 2
Cross-Country Inflation Regressions, 1973-90 Averages with Measures of Central Bank
Independence
Dependent variable = log (average annual CPI growth rate)
Excluding countries that
All countries experienced hyperinflation
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Government spending/GDP 0.74 1.02
(0.83) (0.85)
Non-defense spending/GDP –1.76 –0.15 0.80 –1.38 –0.82 0.17
(0.81) (0.74) (0.85) (0.62) (0.78) (0.86)
Defense spending/GDP –2.33 –2.95 –3.48 –2.82 –3.10 –4.05
(7.48) (6.07) (6.14) (5.92) (5.97) (5.68)
CB legal independence in 1980s –0.06 0.06 0.07 –0.21 –0.09 –0.08
(0.81) (0.78) (0.78) (0.81) (0.75) (0.75)
CB governor turnover rate, 1950-89 3.17 3.03 3.01 1.25 0.79 0.75
(0.67) (0.64) (0.64) (1.05) (1.00) (0.99)
Public debt/GDP, 1973 –0.21 –0.31 –0.19 –0.27
(0.56) (0.53) (0.66) (0.65)
Average log (real GDP per capita) –0.29 –0.28 –0.34 –0.33
(0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Number of countries 43 43 43 43 40 40 40 40
R
2 0.11 0.44 0.51 0.51 0.12 0.21 0.33 0.31
NOTE: CB is central bank. Figures in parentheses are standard errors. All regressions are OLS.
11 The countries excluded are Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay.Han and Mulligan


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.still negative and significant. The same observa-
tion can be made when comparing the IV regres-
sions (columns 3 and 9 in Table 3 with columns
4 and 8 in Table 1). With other variables included
in the regressions, the OLS and IV regressions
using both samples show that inflation is still
negatively related to non-defense spending, but
the effects become statistically insignificant. The
relation between inflation and defense spending
is also negative and statistically insignificant.
Other findings are as follows: First, the effects
of central bank legal independence on inflation
are very weak (in terms of t-statistics) and change
signs from one regression to another. With the
whole sample, both the OLS and IV estimations
show that inflation is significantly positively
related to the turnover rate of central bank gov-
ernors. With the three hyperinflation countries
excluded, the relation is positive in the OLS
regressions and negative in the IV regressions
and none of them is statistically significant. This
suggests that, first, independence written on paper
means little if central bank governors can be easily
removed in reality; second, in determining infla-
tion, central bank independence matters only in
countries that have experienced hyperinflation.
Those countries are presumably those that are
not on the upward-sloping portion of their non-
inflation tax Laffer curves.
Second, all regressions show that inflation is
weakly negatively related to initial debt-to-GDP
ratios. If we think of redemption of initial debt
as part of total government spending, the nega-
tive relation seems consistent with the relation
between inflation and non-defense spending. We
also find that inflation is negatively related to
real GDP per capital (in logs) in all regressions.
This relation is significant except in the IV regres-
sions: The negative relations suggest that coun-
tries with efficient tax systems tend to rely less
on inflation to finance a given amount of govern-
ment spending.
In summary, the cross-country exercises show
that, first, the correlation between inflation and
government size is negative but weak.12 The
negative correlation is driven mainly by the neg-
ative relation between inflation and non-defense
spending. Second, with the whole sample of 80
countries, inflation is significantly positively
related to defense spending. So, when defense
spending is an important fraction of total govern-
ment spending, the conventional view that infla-
tion is positively related to government size holds.
When we include only those countries for which
central bank independence data are available,
inflation is shown weakly negatively related to
defense spending. Our analysis strongly suggests
that the switch of signs of the estimates is caused
mainly by sample attrition. Finally, the regres-
sions also suggest that inflation may be indeed
negatively related to central bank independence,
especially for countries that have experienced
hyperinflation. Also, inflation is shown to be
weakly negatively related to the initial debt-to-
GDP ratio and more strongly negatively related
to real GDP per capita.
TIME-SERIES EVIDENCE
The above cross-country analysis is suitable
for studying the relation between inflation and
government size in the steady state of a dynamic
model or in a static model, which tells us how
inflation responds to long-run or permanent
changes in government spending. To find out
how governments inflate and deflate in response
to temporary changes in government spending,
we have to turn to time-series data. We study this
issue using U.S. and U.K. time-series data.
The United States
For the United States, government size is
defined as the ratio of federal government outlays
to national income.13 We use growth rates of CPI
and M2 as measures of the inflation tax. The data,
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12 Although the inflation tax rate and the size of government do not
display a strong positive relationship across countries, other tax
rates are correlated with the size of government. For example,
regressions with the personal income tax rate show that some tax
rates are positively correlated with government size (results not
reported here). See also Click (1998).
13 We use national income instead of gross national product (GNP)
because we do not have data on GNP for the earlier years. The evi-
dence using GNP (not shown here) is similar to that using national
income for the periods when we have data on both variables.plotted in Figure 3, are annual time series for the
period 1870-1995.14
The figure shows that roughly before 1930,
federal government outlays as a fraction of
national income (solid gray line) is small and
stable, except during the large temporary increase
during World War I. Since 1930, there has been a
secular upward trend in government spending
driven mainly by non-defense spending (thin
black line). The large temporary increases in gov-
ernment spending, however, were driven mainly
by defense spending (solid blue line), as shown
by the spikes for World War II, the Korean War,
and the Vietnam War. Defense spending seems to
return to its steady state in the late 1970s, although
the steady state seems higher than that in the pre-
war period. From the figure, it is not clear how
inflation (dashed blue line) is related to govern-
ment spending, except that inflation during war-
time is usually higher than the normal levels.
The regression results are shown in Table 4.
Regressions in panel A use the growth rate of
CPI as the dependent variable, whereas those in
panel B use the growth rate of M2. In addition to
government spending, we also include the ratio
of government debt in year t–1 to national income
in year t in our regressions. The first four columns
in both panels are OLS regressions using data for
the entire sample period 1870-1995. All OLS
regressions are estimated by assuming that the
error terms follow AR(1) processes. The results
show that the growth rate of CPI is positively
related to non-defense spending but negatively
related to defense spending. Because of price con-
trols during wartime (e.g., World War II), however,
the growth rate of CPI may not be a good measure
of the inflation tax. Instead, the growth rate of the
money supply may be a more reliable measure to
test the public finance theory of inflation in the
time-series context. The regressions shown in the
first four columns of panel B indicate that the
growth rate of M2 is weakly negatively related to
non-defense spending and strongly positively
related to defense spending and government size.
In the rest of the regressions in Table 4, we use
data from only 1936-95. There are two reasons
for considering the short sample period. First,
before 1933, the United States was in the classical
gold-standard period. With the gold standard,
governments have only limited ways to generate
revenue through the inflation tax. Hence, to test
14 The data are from the Historical Statistics of the United States,
1790-1970 (Dodd, 1973) and the Economic Report of the President
(various years).
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.the public finance theory of inflation, the appro-
priate economic system should be the paper stan-
dard. We will discuss this issue further in the fifth
section. Second, as in the cross-country analysis,
we would like to use Social Security spending
(as a ratio of national income) as an IV for govern-
ment spending (especially non-defense spending)
to mitigate the potential bias caused by the endo-
geneity problem. But the Social Security program
started only in the late 1930s.
The IV regressions for the period 1936-95 are
shown in the last four columns of Table 4. To
show the differences between OLS and IV regres-
sions, in the middle four columns we reproduce
the OLS regressions for the period. These results
show that the growth rate of CPI is negatively
related to both non-defense and defense spending
as well as government size. The signs all change
and become positive in the IV regressions. How-
ever, as discussed above, because of price controls
during World War II, those coefficients may be
downward-biased estimates of the relation
between the inflation tax and government size.
The results in panel B show that, for the period
1936-95, the growth rate of M2 is positively
related to both non-defense and defense spending
in both the OLS and IV regressions. Moreover,
the coefficients for defense spending are all sta-
tistically significant while those for non-defense
spending are not significant.
It is also interesting to note that the growth
rate of M2 is shown to be positively related to
government size in all OLS regressions in panel
B. But the signs all change and become negative
in the IV regressions. It is important to note that
Social Security spending is a better IV for non-
defense spending than for government size. The
correlation between Social Security spending
and non-defense spending is 0.80, while the cor-
relation between Social Security spending and
government size is only 0.15. So the IV results
for non-defense spending are more reliable than
those for government size.
Finally, the growth rate of M2 is weakly nega-
tively related to the lagged debt-to-national income
ratios, as we have seen in the cross-country
analysis.
In summary, the evidence based on the U.S.
time-series data shows that inflation is strongly
positively related to government size and the
relation is driven mainly by the strong positive
relation between inflation and defense spending.
The relation between inflation and non-defense
spending is ambiguous and statistically weak.
The United Kingdom
We now turn to the U.K. time series for the
period 1721-1990. We measure government size
by total central government spending as a fraction
of GNP. We also compute the ratios of defense
and non-defense spending to GNP. Inflation is
measured by growth rates of CPI and M1.15 The
time series are plotted in Figure 4. The first notice-
able feature of the figure is that the spikes for the
size of government (solid gray line) are mainly
due to the sharp increases in defense spending
(solid blue line). The United Kingdom fought
several wars during the sample period, resulting
in unusually large temporary increases in defense
spending (as a fraction of GNP).
As with the U.S. time series, the U.K. time
series show a secular upward trend in government
spending (as a fraction of GNP) after World War II
and the trend seems to be associated mainly with
the increases in the size of non-defense spending
(thin black line). On the other hand, the fractions
for defense spending are about the same in the
entire sample period, except during the wars.
Finally, as with the United States, it is not clear
how U.K. inflation (dashed blue line) is related
15 The data on price levels are from McCusker (1992). The data used
to calculate the growth rate of money for the period 1720-1921 are
bank notes of the Bank of England from Mitchell (1988, pp. 655-70)
and since 1922 are M1 from Mitchell (1988, pp. 674, and 1998,
pp. 813-23). The data on central government spending for the
period 1700-1801 are net public expenditures from Mitchell (1988,
pp. 578-80), for 1801-1980 are gross public expenditures from
Mitchell (1988, pp. 587-95), and for 1981-90 are central govern-
ment expenditures from the United Nations (1985, 1994). The data
on defense spending for the period 1700-1980 are from Mitchell
(1988, pp. 578-80, 587-95), which combine the spending for the
army, ordinances, naval and air forces, special expeditions, and
votes of credits. For the period after 1980, the data on defense
spending are from the United Nations (1985, 1994). The data on
GNP for the period 1830-1980 are from Mitchell (1988, pp. 831-36)
and for 1980-90 are from the United Nations (1985, 1994). For the
period 1700-1830, Deane (1967, pp. 78, 282) provides estimates
on the 10-year growth rate of real GNP. To obtain estimates within
a decade, we interpolate this series according to the average annual
growth rate of GNP in a decade.
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during wartime is usually higher than the nor-
mal levels. This is especially true in the paper-
standard period, which is further discussed in
the next section.
The time-series regressions using the growth
rates of CPI (panel A) and M1 (panel B) as depend-
ent variables are shown in Table 5. As in the
analysis of the U.S. time series, we consider
regressions using both the entire sample period
and the paper-standard period 1932-90. All regres-
sions are OLS and assume that the error terms
are AR(1) processes.
The results are similar to what we obtain
using the U.S. time series. First, with the entire
sample period, the growth rates of both CPI and
M1 are positively related to government size as
well as defense and non-defense spending. In
particular, the relation is statistically significant
for the growth rate of M1. Second, for the paper-
standard period, the growth rates of both CPI and
M1 are positively related to defense spending,
but ambiguously related to non-defense spending.
The relation between the growth rate of CPI and
the size of government is also not clear.
We also find that, as in the U.S. time series
and cross-country analysis, the growth rates of
both CPI and M1 are negatively related to the
debt-to-GNP ratio. The main difference is that
for the U.K. time series the relations are statisti-
cally significant in all regressions
In summary, as in the U.S. time-series analy-
sis, we find that inflation is positively related to
government size, which is driven mainly by the
positive relation between inflation and defense
spending. The relation between inflation and




In the previous section, we provided a statisti-
cal analysis of the effects of the stochastic changes
in the size of government on inflation. In this
section, we look specifically into the behavior of
inflation during periods when large and temporary
changes in the size of government are induced
by war.
In British and American history, temporarily
high levels of government spending—especially
defense spending associated with major wars—
were often financed by public debts that were
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Inflation and Government Size and Its Components: United Kingdom, 1721-1990nominally denominated in their own currencies.
Because of these nominal provisions, the theory
of Lucas and Stokey (1983), Judd (1989), and
others suggests that inflation serves as a state-
contingent manager to adjust the real returns on
the public debt. In particular, inflation would
rise on the arrival of “bad” news—the start of a
war—and fall on the arrival of “good” news—the
end of a war. This reduces the real returns on the
public debt during a war but raises the real returns
when a war is over. This high expected real rate
of return after a war induces people to buy govern-
ment debt at reasonable prices and generates the
necessary revenues for fighting a war. Moreover,
the theory also suggests that, from the viewpoint
of optimal taxation, inflation can be desirable in
the event of temporary increases in government
spending because ex post inflation serves as a tax
on a stock variable—money holding—as a kind
of “capital levy.” In both arguments, through the
adjustment of inflation, government achieves a
certain degree of smoothness of total taxes across
different states and reduces the distortion of
taxation.
The presumptions of the previously men-
tioned state-contingent theory are that the govern-
ment has the ability to adjust inflation contingent
Han and Mulligan
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Table 5
Time-Series Regressions of Inflation in the United Kingdom, 1721-1990 and 1932-90
Independent variables 1721-1990 1932-90
A. Dependent variable: growth rate of CPI
Government spending/GNP 0.10 0.21 –0.10 0.08
(0.06) (0.06) (0.12) (0.10)
Non-defense spending/GNP 0.18 0.33 0.37 0.38
(0.13) (0.12) (0.31) (0.30)
Defense spending/GNP 0.07 0.17 0.04 0.11
(0.07) (0.07) (0.10) (0.10)
Debt[t–1]/GNP[t] –0.03 –0.03 –0.04 –0.03
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
R
2 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.07 0.03 0.09
Adjusted DW statistic 1.95 1.94 1.95 1.93 2.38 2.04 2.06 2.12
B. Dependent variable: growth rate of M1
Government spending/GNP 0.27 0.39 0.13 0.32
(0.06) (0.07) (0.18) (0.17)
Non-defense spending/GNP 0.39 0.56 –0.08 –0.12
(0.13) (0.13) (0.60) (0.49)
Defense spending/GNP 0.22 0.34 0.10 0.29
(0.07) (0.08) (0.19) (0.16)
Debt[t–1]/GNP[t] –0.04 –0.04 –0.09 –0.09
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03)
R
2 0.06 0.11 0.07 0.12 0.01 0.14 0.01 0.16
Adjusted DW statistic 1.97 2.10 1.98 2.11 2.08 1.99 2.08 1.98
NOTE: DW is Durbin-Watson. All regressions are OLS. Figures in parentheses are standard errors.on the event of a war and that the government
should also show the public that it commits to
such a contingent policy. In the classical gold
standard system, suspension of convertibility
(and/or lowering of conversion ratios) serves as a
tool to effectively raise inflation at the start of a
war because it allows the government to print
paper money to generate more seigniorage. Infla-
tion in turn also reduces the real value of govern-
ment’s debt payments during the war. At the same
time, resumption of convertibility shows govern-
ment commitment to the state-contingent policy
(Bordo and Kydland, 1996). Hence, the state-
contingent theory of inflation implies that inflation
is high at the beginning and during suspensions
of convertibility and low when convertibility
resumes.
There are two episodes of suspension of con-
vertibility in the United Kingdom in the U.K.
classical gold-standard period (1717-1931): 1797-
1821, because of the war with France (1793-1815);
and 1914-1925, because of World War I. In the
United States, there is one episode of suspension
of convertibility in the U.S. classical gold-standard
period (1792-1933): 1862-79, because of the Civil
War (1862-65). In Table 6, we compare inflation
and money growth during these episodes of sus-
pension with those during the non-suspension
gold-standard periods.
On average, as Table 6 shows, inflation and
the money growth rate are higher in the suspen-
sion than the non-suspension periods. For exam-
ple, in the United Kingdom, the average inflation
is essentially 0 and the M1 growth rate is 0.01 in
the non-suspension periods, whereas the average
inflation ranges from 0.01 to 0.13 and the average
M1 growth rate from 0.03 to 0.17 in the two war-
time suspension periods. The same pattern also
exists in the U.S. episode. Note that, because in
all cases convertibility did not resume until sev-
eral years after a war ended, the inflation and
money growth rates had to be much lower at the
end of each suspension period in order to reach
the low inflation in the non-suspension periods.
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Table 6
Inflation and Money Growth Rates During Suspensions of Convertibility in the Classical
Gold-Standard Periods in the United Kingdom and United States
Inflation Money growth rate*
Number Mean (standard Mean (standard
Episodes of periods deviation) Minimum Peak deviation) Minimum Peak
United Kingdom: 1717-1931
1797-1821 (paper pound) 25 0.00 (0.12) –0.26 0.31 0.03 (0.08) –0.08 0.20
1797-1802 6 0.02 (0.20) –0.26 0.31 0.08 (0.09) –0.04 0.20
(French Revolutionary War)
1803-15 (Napoleonic War) 13 0.01 (0.09) –0.14 0.15 0.04 (0.07) –0.06 0.18
1914-25 12 0.04 (0.16) –0.23 0.24 0.10 (0.14) –0.06 0.35
1914-19 (World War I) 6 0.13 (0.12) –0.10 0.24 0.17 (0.13) 0.05 0.35
Non-suspension periods 178 0.00 (0.06) –0.17 0.20 0.01 (0.10) –0.41 0.41
United States: 1792-1933
1862-79 18 0.01 (0.09) –0.07 0.22 0.04 (0.05) –0.05 0.12
1862-65 4 0.15 (0.09) 0.04 0.22 N/A N/A N/A
(American Civil War)
Non-suspension periods 124 0.00 (0.06) –0.17 0.18 0.05 (0.06) –0.12 0.17
NOTE: *For the United Kingdom, the money growth rate is the growth rate of M1; data are available only since 1721. For the United
States, the money growth rate is the growth rate of M2; data are available only since 1868.war with France (1793-1815), which has two
phases: the French Revolutionary War (1792-1802)
and the Napoleonic War (1803-15). The first trough
of inflation matches the end of the French
Revolutionary War, in which Britain was a winner.
After a brief truce, war begins again in 1803; infla-
tion rises above the normal level again then falls
at the end of the war.
In short, the above analysis shows that, in
the classical gold-standard periods, suspension
and resumption of convertibility serve as a state-
contingent manager to adjust (i) inflation and
(ii) the real returns on government debts during
periods in which there is a temporary need for
increased revenues. As a result, inflation is high
at the beginning of the wars and suspension of
Han and Mulligan
262 MAY/JUNE, PART 2 2008 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW
To see this, we plot time series for U.K. (top two
panels of Figure 5) and U.S. (top left panel of
Figure 6) inflation during these episodes.
As we can see, inflation even started to fall at
the end of each war. U.K. inflation during World
War I16 and U.S. inflation during the Civil War
are high at the beginning of the wars, reach peaks
during the wars, and are low or become negative
at the end of or immediately after the wars. U.K.
inflation seems to behave differently during the
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Wartime Inflation During Suspensions of Convertibility in the Classical Gold Standard Period
and in the Paper Standard Period: United Kingdom, 1721-1990
16 Inflation in both the United Kingdom and the United States did
not decline until a couple of years after the end of World War I.
However, although official fighting in World War I ended on
November 11, 1918, when the armistice was declared, the peace
itself was not established until the Treaty of Versailles was signed
on June 28, 1919, and it did not go into effect until January 10, 1920.convertibility and low at the end of the wars and
the resumption of convertibility.
The above observations on inflation during
the suspension of convertibility in the classical
gold-standard periods also hold for wars after the
classical gold-standard periods. Table 7 shows
the summary statistics of inflation during wars
since 1933. The time series for inflation during
these times of war are plotted in Figure 5 for the
United Kingdom (lower panel) and Figure 6 for
the United States (top-right and lower panels). In
all cases except the Vietnam War (1965-73),17
inflation is high at the beginning, reaches a peak
in the middle, and is low at the conclusion of a
war. This supports the theory that inflation is
above normal on the receipt of “bad news” of
government fiscal situations—the start of a war—
and below normal upon the receipt of “good
news”—the end of war.
For the United States, inflation rose at the end
of the Vietnam War. Note that the Vietnam War is
one of the few wars since U.S. independence
Han and Mulligan
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Wartime Inflation During Suspensions of Convertibility in the Classical Gold Standard Period
and in the Paper Standard Period: United States, 1792-1995
17 For both the United Kingdom and the United States, inflation
remained at high levels after Word War II. Grossman (1990) argues
that the continuing high inflation after World War II can be explained
by the changes in factors increasing the power of debtors relative
to that of creditors in the political process and the large demands
on national resources for huge postwar reconstruction and main-
tenance of a nuclear arsenal.that did not end in an unmistakable American
victory. This suggests that ending a war alone is
not always good news for a government’s fiscal
situation. For a defeated country, its government
has to face tougher challenges, both economically
and politically, to raise necessary revenues using
only non-inflation taxes to meet the needs of post-
war reconstructions, debt repayments, and, pos-
sibly, large war reparations. This provides more
incentives for the government to rely on inflation
as a revenue source. These episodes and the high
inflations in the defeated countries18 after the
two World Wars suggest that inflation responds
strongly to the nature of how a war ends and the
ability of a government to meet its future fiscal
obligations.
SUMMARY
In this paper we review the implications of
existing theories on the relationship between
inflation and the size of government and study
how the theoretical predictions match empirical
evidence. We find that the strongest empirical
relationship between inflation and the size of
government arises from wartime. Inflation was
fairly high during several British and American
wars and often negative after wars. We also find
that permanently high non-defense government
spending—as observed across countries—seems
to be weakly negatively related to inflation while
defense spending is somewhat more strongly
positively related. Also there has been a slight
secular increase in inflation with the size of gov-
ernment over time, which we cannot account for
with defense spending.
The static or steady-state Ramsey theory thus
fails to predict the magnitude of the inflation tax.
Not only is the theory ambiguous about the sign
of the relationship between inflation and the size
of government, it also fails to explain why wars
are the best predictors of inflation and why the
composition of government spending is correlated
with inflation.
To the extent that wars are surprises, a
dynamic stochastic Ramsey theory (such as Lucas
and Stokey, 1983) does explain the strong corre-
lation between inflation and temporary wartime
government spending, although perhaps not the
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Table 7
Inflation and Money Growth Rates During Wars in the Post-Classical Gold-Standard Periods in
the United Kingdom and United States
Inflation Money growth rate*
Number Mean (standard Mean (standard
Episodes of periods deviation) Minimum Peak deviation) Minimum Peak
United Kingdom: 1932-90
1941-45 (World War II) 5 0.07 (0.07) 0.00 0.17 0.15 (0.03) 0.12 0.21
Non-war periods 54 0.06 (0.06) –0.07 0.26 0.08 (0.11) –0.06 0.80
United States: 1834-95
1941-45 (World War II) 5 0.05 (0.03) 0.01 0.10 0.15 (0.04) 0.10 0.21
1950-53 (Korean War) 4 0.03 (0.03) 0.01 0.07 0.05 (0.01) 0.03 0.06
1965-73 (Vietnam War) 9 0.04 (0.01) 0.02 0.06 0.08 (0.03) 0.04 0.13
Non-suspension periods 44 0.04 (0.04) –0.02 0.14 0.06 (0.03) –0.00 0.13
NOTE: *For the United Kingdom, the money growth rate is the growth rate of M1; for the United States, it is the growth rate of M2.
18 During Word War II, the Nazi government in Germany imposed
strict prices to keep inflation low. After its defeat in 1945, currency
reform was carried out. As a result, there was no high inflation in
Germany. Other defeated countries such as Japan and Italy expe-
rienced high inflation after the war.relationship with more permanent defense
spending.
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